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Changing the Tax Code to Create Consumer-Driven Health Insurance 
Competition  
Policy	Points  
 
• Current tax law prevents workers from trading employer-paid insurance premiums for 
greater take-home pay, and many middle- and lower-income workers thus pay for health 
plans that are more expensive than plans they would directly choose for themselves in a 
consumer-driven system.  
 
• Minor changes to current tax law can allow employees to receive their employers’ 
premium contribution directly and then purchase health insurance themselves, using tax-
free funds.  Employees could deduct for income tax purposes the amount used for 
insurance and, if they spend less than the amount transferred, take the remainder as taxed 
income. Our simulation shows that giving workers this option will increase incomes 
($160-$167 billion annually) and tax revenue ($46-$48 billion annually), reduce income 
inequality, and may control health care costs. 
 
• Three countries with high-performing, cost-controlled health systems—Germany, 
Switzerland, and Singapore—institute similar policies that allow individuals to purchase 
their own health insurance tax-free.  
 
 
Abstract		
	
Context:		Because current tax laws exclude employer-paid health insurance premiums from 
employees’ taxable wages and income, employer-sponsored insurance remains the primary 
source of health insurance for most employed Americans. Economists have long blamed the 
employer-based insurance tax exclusion for inflating health care costs, and, more recently, for 
constraining income growth and exacerbating income inequality. 
 
Methods: We execute a simulation to test the effect of permitting employees to receive their 
employers’ premium contribution directly and then purchase health insurance themselves, using 
tax-free funds.  Employees could deduct for income tax purposes the amount used for insurance 
and, if they spend less than the amount transferred, take the remainder as taxed income. 
 
Findings: Our simulation indicates that in this consumer-driven system many workers would 
trade some insurance dollars for higher income, even if the latter is taxed.  Our alternative tax 
treatment causes annual after-tax household income to grow by more than $160 billion and 
	 4	
federal tax revenues by more than $46 billion.  Along the way, take-home pay inequality is 
reduced, and the greater take-up of slimmed down policies could lead to greater cost control.  
 
Conclusions: A simple change in the tax treatment of employer-sponsored health insurance can 
give workers the flexibility to economize on health insurance purchases.  With this flexibility, 
many workers will select health plans that are less expensive than those now chosen for them.   
This will inject much-needed price competition in health insurance markets.  It will also allow 
workers to enjoy more take-home pay, thereby counteracting the negative and regressive effects 
of escalating health care inflation.  These results cannot be achieved from granting tax credits for 
the purchase of health insurance because such credits do not permit workers to trade insurance 
dollars for wages. 
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Introduction 
The outsized costs of the U.S. health care system create major economic problems.  
Health care expenditures squeeze out needed funds for education, public safety, and other social 
responsibilities, rising costs constrain income growth, and the incidence of costs exacerbates 
income inequality.  And health care cost inflation continues to grow at rates far higher than the 
rest of the economy causing an increased percentage of U.S. GDP to be spent in the health care 
sector, growing from 13.1% in 2000 to 17.1% in 2014, while health care remains one of the least 
productive sectors in the U.S. economy.1  
The current federal tax treatment of employer-paid health insurance expenses is a major 
cause of these problems.  Current law excludes from taxable wages and income any health 
insurance premiums that employers pay for their employees or self-employed individuals pay for 
themselves.2  In contrast, individuals who are not self-employed and purchase health insurance 
for themselves receive much more limited tax deductions.3  The favorable tax treatment for 
employer-sponsored insurance is a primary reason why the U.S. lacks the kind of consumer-
driven, competitive market for health insurance that it enjoys for most other products.  Instead, in 
2013, 150 million Americans were insured by employers while only 6 million paid for individual 
insurance out of their own pockets.4 This employer-sponsored market allowed only limited 
choice: in 2016, 83% of the employers that offered health insurance offered only one kind of 
plan.5   
Economists and health policy experts have long argued that the tax exclusion for 
employer-sponsored health insurance has pernicious economic consequences for both the 
national economy and workers’ incomes.6  First, most economists agree that employer-purchase 
of health insurance causes needless inflation of health care costs.7 Although employers’ payment 
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of their employees’ health insurance expense is one component of employees’ wages or salaries,8 
employees typically view it as a free benefit and, thus, are insulated from the cost control that 
generally accompanies direct consumer purchase.9   
 Second, rising health insurance costs suppressed wage growth:10  health insurance 
premiums grew at annual rates of 7.5-7.7% for family and single coverage from 2000-2016, 
whereas wages grew at rates ranging from only 1.80% (for the lowest quintile of family incomes) 
to 2.64% (for the highest quintile).11  In addition, employers increased their employees’ 
contributions to health insurance premiums at higher rates than their own contributions: for 
family coverage, employee contributions grew at an annual average of 7.5% between 2000 and 
2016, whereas employer contributions grew at 6.74%.12  This seemingly small difference 
translated to major financial effects. We illustrate in Table 1 how this difference over time 
translates into large differences from a normalized contribution.  Also, over this same period, 
insurance plans became less generous, imposing more cost sharing burdens on the insureds.  Out-
of-pocket health care expenses by insured employers rose at an annual rate of 6.34%, from $558 
to $747, from 2004-2016.13  Those in the top 15% of spending, who accounted for 75% of total 
health benefit costs, spent $2,678 for cost sharing in 2014.14 
 
Table 1: Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of Employers’ and Employees’ 
Contributions to Family Health Insurance Premiums, 2000-2016, and Its Effect on 2000 
Payment of $10,000 
 
 Contribution 
CAGR* 
 
2000 
 
2016 
Employee:  7.50% $10,000 $35,503 
Employer:   6.74% $10,000 $28,253 
 
*Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, Employer Health Benefits Surveys, http://kff.org/health-costs/report/2016-employer-health-benefits-
survey/, accessed March 2, 2017 
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These cost and inflation dynamics increased income inequality, a matter of growing 
political concern.  Because employer-based health insurance premiums typically do not vary 
with income, the employer’s shift of increased payments for health insurance to employees 
exacted a larger toll on lower income employees.15  As average employer-sponsored family 
premiums rose from $3,660 to $15,745 between 1988 and 2012, they increased from between 
13% to 60% of the growth of total compensation for families in the bottom 40% of the income 
scale, but from only 1.4% to 4.5% for families in the upper 5%.16 
 The underlying problem of the tax exclusion is that what appears to be a subsidy for an 
employee’s benefit works contrary to their interest.  The resulting employer-driven system  
discourages competition by limiting the number of health insurers that would contain costs if 
subjected to greater competition;17 causes workers to purchase more health insurance than they 
would otherwise purchase directly; and disproportionately increases the workers’ share of the 
costs of insurance.  
This paper tests that proposition by executing a simulation that examines the consequence 
of changing the way health insurance is purchased. In our simulation, employees directly receive 
their employers’ payment for health insurance and may spend up to that amount on a plan of 
their choosing.  If they purchase a plan that costs less than the full amount, which fulfills the 
requirements of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), they may take the remainder as taxed take-
home pay.  
Our simulation indicates that workers capitalize on this opportunity to economize on 
health insurance.  As a result, many benefits accrue to the economy:  annual after-tax household 
income grows by more than $160 billion, tax revenues grow by more than $46 billion; income 
inequality is reduced—low income workers benefitted far more than high income ones; and 
	 4	
perhaps most important, the health insurance market is subjected to greater pressures for cost 
control.18 
Proposals of this nature were also suggested by Martin Feldstein19 and Regina 
Herzlinger.20 As we discuss below, other proposals to deal with the tax exclusion issue seem 
similar but differ in their intent, political appeal, and, perhaps, their economic consequences: 
some recommended tax credits rather than deductions for the purchase of health insurance21 and 
others required taxing employer contributions to health insurance.22  
We then analyze how this proposals fits into the ACA or its most likely replacements.  
We continue to describe how three nations with high performance, cost-controlled, universal 
coverage health care systems – Switzerland, Singapore, and Germany – implement similar 
consumer-driven mechanisms in which individual tax deductions facilitate the individual 
purchase of health insurance.  Finally, we outline the (surprisingly simple) regulatory changes 
required to implement such a system in the U.S. 
 
Simulating the Effect of a Personal Income Tax Deduction  
If employees directly received their employers’ payment for health insurance and could 
deduct the amount they used to purchase health insurance, the problems of stagnating personal 
income and inequality would be ameliorated.  Our simulation indicates that after tax-income will 
grow by more than $160 billion annually with lower income earners gaining much more 
proportionate after-tax income than higher income ones.  Federal income tax revenues will rise 
by more than $46 billion as workers opt for more marginal after-tax income and less pre-tax 
health insurance. 
The mechanisms that drive these results are: 
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a) Employees receive payments from employer’s equal, in aggregate, to the total health 
insurance payments paid out as part of their normal wages. 
b) Employees then purchase their own plans and the cost of these employee-purchased 
plans is excluded from taxable income.  If employees purchase plans that cost less 
than the aggregate payment they receive from their employers, they take home the 
remainder as taxed wages. 
c) People who purchase their own insurance are more cost-conscious than when their 
employer purchases it on their behalf.  Thus, when employees are given the 
opportunity to purchase their own plans, more will purchase less expensive plans than 
under the current system.  The insurance market, in turn, will make less expensive 
plans more readily available. 
Although some employers may claim that their self-insured health plans (i.e. a plan in 
which the organization takes on the risk function of insuring health expenses itself 
and uses insurers only for administrative services) controlled premiums better than 
the fully insured plans consumers can buy for themselves, premium growth rates for 
self–insured plans were not materially different from those in fully-insured plans. 
Between 2000 and 2014, the premium growth rate for self-insured plans was 7.7%, 
versus 7.65% for fully insured ones.23 
d) If employees purchase less expensive plans, then less income is excluded from 
taxation and more goes towards wages; thus employees enjoy more take home 
income and the government receives more tax revenue. 
Central to our argument is the premise that health care consumers respond to the 
availability of choice and opportunities to economize.  Economic research bears this out. One 
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analysis found a 20% increase of employee consumer surplus resulting from a similar tax policy 
because it enables employees to choose different plans from those offered by their employers.24 
Similarly, a study of 51 Medicare Part D prescription drug plans (PDPs) available to the average 
enrollee found that by switching plans individuals significantly reduced their annual prescription 
drug expenses.25 Yet few employer-sponsored health insurance markets give individuals 
meaningful choices.  In 2015, for example, 83% of employers offered a choice of only one plan 
and 13% offered only two.26   
There is widespread recognition that health insurance consumers would like more choices 
and market participants are looking for opportunities to provide them. For example, Aon Hewett, 
a private-sector health insurance exchange marketplace, offered workers hundreds of health 
plans.27  And, likely in recognition of a growing consumer-driven health insurance market, 
venture capitalists (VCs) in 2015 doubled their investments in health insurance and technology. 
These newly-minted insurance firms included Oscar, valued at $2.7 billion, Clover, and Melody 
Health Insurance. VC money also poured into firms involved with buying, selling, and managing 
health insurance.28   
  There is, however, debate about whether a larger set of choices helps or overloads 
employees. One evaluation of the choices of elders across the many insurance options available 
under Medicare Part D found that consumers place more weight on plan premiums than on 
expected out-of-pocket costs; value plan financial characteristics beyond any impact on their 
own financial expenses or risk; and place almost no value on variance-reducing aspects of plans. 
This analysis implied that welfare would have been 27 percent higher if patients had all chosen 
rationally.29  Yet, a different analysis of individuals’ decisions to switch PDPs from 2006-2010 
found that only 50% of individuals were in their original PDP by January 2010. Individuals 
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switched PDPs in response to increases in their status quo plans’ costs, and over time they 
become increasingly responsive to large increases in their status quo plans’ costs. Switching 
increased when more plans were available, particularly more relatively lower-cost plans.30  
Another analysis of a sample of Medicare Part D enrollees found that 81% of consumers reduced 
overspending over time.  Overspending, on average, was reduced by $298. The greatest 
improvements were by those who overspent most and by those who switched plans. Decisions to 
switch depended on individuals’ overspending and on individual-specific effects of changes in 
their current plans. The oldest consumers and those initiating medications for Alzheimer’s 
disease improved by more than the average, suggesting the importance of transparency that 
enables support from others.31  
We find similar evidence of employers’ ability to choose prudently from results obtained  
after retirement packages moved from defined benefit (DB) plans, in which employers invested 
their employees’ pension funds, to defined contribution (DC) ones, in which individuals invested 
these funds.  The investment performance of employers and employees were virtually identical. 
One study found that, between 1990 and 2012, DB plans outperformed DC ones by only .7%,32 
and another study concluded that there were only small and statistically insignificant differences 
in the returns of DC and DB plans, from 1995-2012.33  Refuting the supposition of administrative 
economies of scale for large employer-directed plans, the costs for employer-directed and 
employee-directed pension plans were virtually indistinguishable.  A study comparing DC and 
DB plans found that administrative costs varied with the size of plans and did not differ between 
DC and DB plans.34  The large private health insurance exchanges for individuals will likely 
demonstrate similar results.35    
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The Simulation:  Methods, Data and Results 
The simulation is carried out at the household level. Households are assumed to vary on 
two dimensions: income and whether the household’s health insurance is employment-based. 
The proportions of households and mean household income for those with employment-based 
insurance for each income group were estimated using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Current Population Survey, Annual Social Economic Supplement.36   
The simulation accounts for the concentration of health expenditures by transferring 
greater sums to the sick.  The concentration of the costs of sick enrollees is variously estimated 
as: 
• 11% of households account for 69% of costs.37  
• 20% of households account for 80% of costs (Pareto Principle); and 
• 5% of households account for 50% of costs.38  
The 5% and 20% data are for the population as a whole, rather than for an employer 
pool; the 11% data are for an employer pool but the data date back to 2005.   
The income elasticity of demand for health insurance comes from “The Elasticity of 
Demand for Health Care: A Review of the Literature and Its Application to the Military Health 
System,”39 a report by the RAND Corporation. The estimates of income elasticity of demand are 
in the range of 0 to 0.2. There is a body of thought that holds that income elasticity might be 
somewhat higher for analysis done on aggregate levels,40 but we use the RAND numbers because 
we are simulating these effects as close to the micro level as feasible. The price elasticity of 
demand is set to -0.2. This value comes from pages 25 and 26 of “The Elasticity of Demand for 
Health Care: A Review of the Literature and Its Application to the Military Health System.” The 
literature gives ranges of possible values for the income and price elasticities of demand. We use 
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the midpoint of those ranges as initial values to our simulation. (To examine how the simulation 
results respond to variations in those input values see: https://amarder.shinyapps.io/rherzlinger/.) 
  In response to the relatively wide range of price elasticity estimates in the early health 
demand literature from -0.0741 to -1.5,42 the government funded a social insurance experiment 
that was designed to answer a number of important questions surrounding the demand for health 
care. The RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) (Newhouse et al., 1993)43 ran from 1974 to 
1982 and randomized families in six sites into different insurance plans. The plans varied by 
level of cost-sharing, out-of-pocket maximum expenditure, and size of deductibles. Although the 
HIE was conducted approximately 40 years ago, the results of the related studies are still 
considered the ‘gold standard’ for health demand elasticity estimates. The experimental design 
enables researchers to sidestep the selection and endogeneity problems associated with 
observational studies.  
The analysis of the HIE compares health care use across individuals in different 
insurance plans. Use of health care services in the HIE was not affected by the out-of-pocket 
maximums. Consequently, for estimation purposes all insurance plans with the same coinsurance 
structure were considered the same. For coinsurance rates between 0 and 25 percent, the price 
elasticity of medical expenditures was found to be -0.17. Consistent with the patterns seen in 
observational studies, the demand for health care was found to be somewhat more price sensitive 
as the coinsurance rate increased. In the HIE, coinsurance rates between 25 and 95 percent 
yielded elasticity estimates of -0.22. The magnitude of the elasticities estimated from the HIE fall 
at the lower end of the range of previous estimates.” 
The simulation presumes continuation of the ACA’s mandates, which require that all 
individuals must purchase insurance with coverage of likely expenses and that insurers must 
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offer insurance to all individuals without price adjustments for risks, other than age. (Details of 
the simulation, including the equations used and sources of the data, are in the Appendix.)  
The starting data shown in Table 2, “Simulation Starting Values and Parameters”:  
Table 2:  Simulation Starting Values and Parameters44 
	
	
Income	Group	
Has	
Employment-	
Based	
Insurance	
(ESI)	
	
#	Households	
	
	
Mean	
Income	
	
Health	
Insurance	
Premiums	
	
	
Income	 	 	 	
Elasticity	
	
Price	
Elasticity	
Less	than	
$25,000	
Yes	 4,396,036	 $15,884	 $17,546	 0.1	 -0.2	
$25,000	to	
$49,999	
Yes	 13,131,180	 $37,834	 $17,546	 0.1	 -0.2	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
$50,000	to	
$74,999	
Yes	 14,163,020	 $61,696	 $17,546	 0.1	 -0.2	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
$75,000	to	
$99,999	
Yes	 11,714,740	 $86,244	 $12,546	 0.1	 -0.2	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
$100,000	or	
more	
Yes	 27,934,230	 $177,484	 $17,546	 0.1	 -0.2	
 
 
Table 3 below groups households into two different groups: high- and low-cost. The 
model recognizes that high-cost households require a large income transfer to cover their high 
health insurance premiums while low-cost households require a much smaller transfer. Below is 
an example of how we compute the size of the required transfer if 11% of the employee group 
accounts for 69% of costs.  In this example, we use  the numbers from the first row of Table 2 to 
derive the pre-intervention health insurance premium in the first two rows of Table 3. Prior to 
the intervention the total cost of health insurance for households with income less than $25,000 
is:  
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 The simulation indicates that the price effect of removing the employer subsidy to 
purchase health insurance outweighs the income effect of increasing employee income. This 
result originates from two sources: (1) the percentage change in health insurance price is larger 
than the percentage change in income, and (2) as the elasticity, consumers have been found to be 
more responsive to changes in health insurance prices versus changes in income, as reflected in 
the elasticity inputs reflect. To assure realistic insurance premiums estimates, we limited the 
decrease in their price to 20%.  The differing elasticities also caused the simulation result that 
low-income households who received large transfers purchased more health insurance than their 
total income.  To adjust, we used the mid-point formula to calculate percentage changes in 
income and price. For example, if income increased from $10 to $15, the midpoint formula 
calculates the change as: (15-10)/ [(10+15)/2] =40%.   
The net effects of the policy are a reduction in the cost of health insurance purchased, an 
increase in taxable income, and an increase in tax revenue, as shown in Table 3, “Simulation’s 
Predicted Changes in Health Insurance Premiums, Income, and Tax Revenue,” below. 
In sum, the simulations indicates that after-tax household income will grow by more than $160 
billion and tax revenues by more than $46 billion annually.  Income increases proportionately 
more for lower-and middle-income workers then for upper income ones and more for the sick. 
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The simulation’s explicit transfer of funds to the sick would motivate insurers to focus 
increased attention on this population, which  accounts for a significant 50%-80% of their 
revenues.  The resulting competition could drive down premiums in excess of the 20% reduction 
we estimated.  Experts have estimated that up to a third of health care expenditures are wasted45 
and competition focused on the most expensive users of health care could help to wring out a 
large proportion of these costs. 
 
Table 3:  Predicted Changes in the Health Insurance Premiums, Income, and Tax 
Revenues with Different Concentrations of Health Care Expenses  
11% of population = 69% costs 
Income 
Group 
Has 
ESI Sick 
Number of 
Households 
Health 
Insurance 
Premium, Pre-
Intervention 
Health 
Insurance 
Premium, 
Post-
Intervention 
Income 
Increase 
Total After-Tax 
Income Change 
New Tax 
Revenue 
Less than 
$25,000 
Yes Yes 483,563 $110,061 $102,523 46% $3,166,907,307 $478,338,374 
Less than 
$25,000 
Yes No 3,912,472 $6,112 $4,941 7% $4,120,141,941 $457,793,549 
$25,000 
to 
$49,999 
Yes Yes 1,444,429 $110,061 $98,480 30% $14,218,507,448 $2,509,148,373 
$25,000 
to 
$49,999 
Yes No 11,686,750 $6,112 $4,835 3% $12,679,817,275 $2,237,614,813 
$50,000 
to 
$74,999 
Yes Yes 1,557,932 $110,061 $95,808 23% $18,874,322,573 $3,330,762,807 
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Income 
Group 
Has 
ESI Sick 
Number of 
Households 
Health 
Insurance 
Premium, Pre-
Intervention 
Health 
Insurance 
Premium, 
Post-
Intervention 
Income 
Increase 
Total After-Tax 
Income Change 
New Tax 
Revenue 
$50,000 
to 
$74,999 
Yes No 12,605,087 $6,112 $4,801 2% $14,038,080,096 $2,477,308,252 
$75,000 
to 
$99,999 
Yes Yes 1,288,621 $110,061 $94,000 16% $15,522,492,158 $5,174,164,053 
$75,000 
to 
$99,999 
Yes No 10,426,118 $6,112 $4,785 1% $10,369,721,977 $3,456,573,992 
$100,000 
or more 
Yes Yes 3,072,765 $110,061 $90,605 10% $43,045,228,233 $16,739,810,979 
$100,000 
or more 
Yes No 24,861,464 $6,112 $4,764 1% $24,119,061,712 $9,379,635,110 
Totals       $160,154,280,720 $46,241,150,303 
20% of population = 80% of costs 
 
Income 
Group 
Has 
ESI Sick 
Number of 
Households 
Health 
Insurance 
Premium, 
Pre-
Intervention 
Health 
Insurance 
Premium, 
Post-
Intervention 
Income 
Increase 
Total After-Tax 
Income Change 
New Tax 
Revenue 
Less 
than 
$25,000 
Yes Yes 879,207 $70,184 $64,149 37% $4,634,232,194 $671,391,824 
Less 
than 
$25,000 
Yes No 3,516,828 $4,386 $3,511 6% $2,769,580,047 $307,731,116 
$25,000 
to 
$49,999 
Yes Yes 2,626,236 $70,184 $61,236 23% $19,975,063,268 $3,525,011,165 
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Income 
Group 
Has 
ESI Sick 
Number of 
Households 
Health 
Insurance 
Premium, 
Pre-
Intervention 
Health 
Insurance 
Premium, 
Post-
Intervention 
Income 
Increase 
Total After-Tax 
Income Change 
New Tax 
Revenue 
$25,000 
to 
$49,999 
Yes No 10,504,944 $4,386 $3,453 2% $8,336,967,664 $1,471,229,588 
$50,000 
to 
$74,999 
Yes Yes 2,832,604 $70,184 $59,567 17% $25,563,649,072 $4,511,232,189 
$50,000 
to 
$74,999 
Yes No 11,330,416 $4,386 $3,435 2% $9,165,588,596 $1,617,456,811 
$75,000 
to 
$99,999 
Yes Yes 2,342,948 $70,184 $58,534 12% $20,471,376,404 $6,823,792,135 
$75,000 
to 
$99,999 
Yes No 9,371,792 $4,386 $3,426 1% $6,748,220,141 $2,249,406,714 
$100,00
0 or 
more 
Yes Yes 5,586,846 $70,184 $56,777 7% $53,931,083,181 $20,973,199,015 
$100,00
0 or 
more 
Yes No 22,347,384 $4,386 $3,415 0% $15,626,792,892 $6,077,086,125 
Totals       $167,222,553,461 $48,227,536,681 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on Individual Tax Deduction of Health 
Insurance Expenses 
 
 
The ACA diminishes the following concerns about this proposal: 
• “Non Purchase” and “Death Spirals”: Unaffordable premium prices occur in 
insurance markets in which sick people are the primary enrollees. The ACA requires 
the purchase of health insurance, thus reducing the concern that individuals will not 
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use the transferred funds for the purchase of health insurance and ensuring the 
participation of healthy enrollees.  
Under the ACA, the penalty for those who do not buy health insurance ranges from a 
minimum of $695 to a maximum of $2,484 per adult and $12,420 for a family of 
three or more children.46  It is likely, however, that the ACA did not pool risk 
adequately because its penalties were too weak. In 2014, approximately 7.5 million 
individuals paid the penalty rather than purchasing insurance, and of the 
approximately 15 million uninsured people who were ineligible for Medicaid, an 
estimated 7.1 million would pay a penalty lower than the cost of the least expensive 
plan.47 
Other countries with a consumer-driven health insurance market achieve nearly 
universal compliance through this and similar mechanisms, though with stiffer 
penalties. In Switzerland, for example, tax returns indicate whether an individual 
purchased health insurance. The canton buys health insurance for the uninsured and 
then bills them, bringing suit against those who fail to pay.48 
• Unaffordability of Health Insurance for the Sick. The ACA enables high-risk 
individuals to purchase affordable health insurance because it forbids individual 
underwriting, contains a guaranteed issue provision, and risk adjusts insurers that 
offer policies in public exchanges.49 Risk adjustment is also featured for insurers in 
most private health insurance exchanges that are offered to a specific employer 
group.50 Thus, high-risk individuals who receive their employer’s average payment as 
a transfer will be able to buy affordable health insurance coverage. 
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• Inadequate Coverage. The ACA mandates the purchase of insurance plans with 
adequate actuarial coverage, thus reducing the risk of individuals’ buying insurance 
with inadequate coverage that may cause them to deplete their resources and require 
public support.51 
• Insufficient Transfer of Employer-funds. Current law requires employers to disclose 
to both the IRS and to their employees the amounts52 they spend on health insurance.  
These disclosures are made by filing W-2 forms, and employers that fail to submit 
accurate W-2s in a timely manner are subject to a sliding scale of civil and criminal 
penalties.  These enforcement mechanisms thus reduce an employer’s ability to 
shortchange amounts promised to employees.53 We discuss needed amplifications 
below. 
Likely Impact of ACA Repeal 
If each of the features in the ACA listed above are repealed, this plan can still offer 
worker choice and enable workers to economize without exposing them to financial or health 
dangers.  The key in the absence of ACA requirements to buy insurance products offered is to 
rely on other regulatory tools to assure that workers use their health care funds to purchase 
health insurance with adequate protections. 
Prior to the ACA, the responsibility of assuring the quality of health insurance products 
fell to state departments of insurance (DOIs) and general consumer protection laws.  In the 
absence of ACA requirements, state DOIs and Attorneys General are likely to reassume these 
responsibilities.  Moreover, if the Trump Administration pursues the campaign pledge of 
allowing cross-state marketing of insurance plans, scrutiny of any potential malfeasance by 
plans, such as misinformation, inadequate benefits, or aggressive denials, will assume 
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magnified importance.  To be sure, giving lay workers the autonomy to select their own plans 
comes at a hazard, but workers could be adequately protected against predatory or unseemly 
conduct if other regulatory mechanisms work adequately. 
Moreover, removal of ACA protections also highlights the importance and potential of 
expanding transparency in health insurance regimes.  Both state governments and private sector 
actors would face increased pressure to provide, digest, and disseminate cost and quality 
information regarding insurance options so that workers could rely on consumer information 
about their choices when they autonomously select plans. 
Should the Trump administration opt to keep the ACA quality requirements in form 
while reducing their stringency in substance, they might simply reduce the minimum actuarial 
value currently permitted on the individual market.  Under current law, bronze plans offer an 
actuarial value of 60 percent, meaning that enrollees can, on average, expect that the plan will 
cover 60 percent of their medical expenses54 (for reference, employer plans tend to have 
actuarial values that exceed  80 percent55).  Lowering actuarial values would commensurately 
lower premiums.  Some Republican thought leaders have proposed reworking ACA’s metal 
tiers in the ACA to actuarial values of 40, 55, 70, and 85 percent for bronze, silver, gold, and 
platinum plans, respectively.56  
Another tweak of the ACA could narrow the law’s essential health benefits.  The ACA 
enumerates 10 categories of “essential health benefits” (EHBs) that insurers are required to 
cover, and the law instructs the Secretary of HHS to define those EHB requirements.57  While 
the Obama administration delegated to the states the authority to define EHB requirements, a 
Trump administration might narrowly redefine each category, thereby likely reducing the cost 
of insurance.58 
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Promoting choice of plans for workers will be pursued within private exchanges, in 
which large or multiple employers pool a population of workers, to whom multiple plans are 
offered.59 Efforts to dilute or remove the ACA’s requirements, as described above, will likely 
also promote worker choice by expanding the number of potential insurance options.  
Loosening requirements for network adequacy, EHBs, and/or actuarial values would promote 
the offerings of low-cost insurance plans.   
 
How Direct Transfer and Personal Deduction Differ from Health Insurance Tax Credits 
for the Purchase of Health Insurance and Taxation of Health Insurance Premiums  
 
Economists have long argued for tax credits to remedy lack of insurance by employed 
individuals and the problems created by the tax preference for employer-driven health 
insurance.60  They opted for credits because, unlike deductions, tax credits do not favor high-
income tax payers. The Congressional Republicans’ original Patient Care Act offered a tax break 
equivalent to 65% of an average plan’s cost and grew it at the CPI plus 1%.61  Its updated 2017 
version capped the exclusion at $12,000 for an individual and $30,000 for a family and 
maintained the same growth rate.62 
But tax credits limit consumers to using the credit only for purchasing health insurance. In 
contrast, a direct transfer of employer expenses for health insurance and a tax deduction in the 
amount of the expenditures of the individual’s purchase of health insurance enables consumers to 
choose between marginal pre-tax health insurance and marginal after-tax income. Further, 
behavioral economics research indicates that people find a credit to be less straightforward and 
are therefore less likely to act.63 
Additionally, the original plan, and some of the subsequent plans, unfairly limited the 
transfer that workers would receive from their employers. Workers pay for all of the health 
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insurance offered by their employers and so should receive the entire amount. And because 
employer health insurance transfers are an element of employees’ income that was indexed to 
medical inflation, these transfers should grow with that inflation, not the CPI. 
 Other economists have recommended eliminating the tax exclusion altogether, an obviously 
politically perilous option.64 Unlike our proposal, this recommendation lowers employees’ take 
home pay. As a further difference from our proposal, it does not offer workers a choice between 
pre-tax health insurance and after-tax income.   
Experiences of Other Countries That Allow Personal Tax Deduction of Health Insurance 
Expenses 
 
Switzerland, Germany, and Singapore are high income countries that have achieved 
good-to-excellent health care outcomes at significantly lower cost and, for Germany and 
Switzerland, better cost control than the United States and single payer countries, such as the UK 
and Canada. (See Table 4, “Percentage of GDP Spent on Health Care (2014); Ratio of Health 
Care Expense, per capita, CAGR, per capita, CAGR”). Singapore, for example, devotes only 
4.7% of its GDP to health care and Switzerland and Germany each spend approximately 11% of 
GDP versus 17.1% for the U.S.  Health care spending per capita ranges from $2,881 for 
Singapore to $4,920 for Germany and $6,325 for Switzerland compared to $9,086 for the U.S.65 
Lower costs have likely contributed to higher 2015 household savings rate in Germany (9.2%) 
and Switzerland (17.1%) than the U.S. (5.2%). Similarly, Singapore’s overall 2014 savings rate 
is 54.7% of GDP compared to 17% for the U.S.66    
 
Table 4: Percentage of GDP Spent on Health Care (2014); Ratio of CAGR of Health 
Care Expense, per capita, to GDP, per capita 
 
Canada 10.45% 1.33 
Germany 11.30% 1.18 
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Singapore 4.92% 1.68 
Switzerland 11.66% 1.23 
United Kingdom 9.12% 1.52 
United States  17.14% 1.62 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators database, accessed March 2, 2017 and computed by 
Jeff Cronin, Harvard Business School Research, Boston, MA 02163 
 
The three countries tax shelter individual purchase of health insurance in different ways. 
In Switzerland, individuals buy health insurance directly and the premiums are tax-deductible.67  
In Germany, premiums are deducted from workers’ wages on a pre-tax basis. In Singapore, both 
contributions to and withdrawals from compulsory health savings accounts are tax exempt, and 
because they are typically used to pay insurance premiums, premium purchases are tax 
advantaged as well.68 
All three are similar to the U.S. in how individual coverage is assured and in the required 
coverage and benefits characteristics of insurance, allowances for out of pocket payments for 
medical care, and reliance on a large number of private sector insurers: 
a. In Switzerland, tax returns indicate whether an individual purchased health insurance. 
The canton buys health insurance for the uninsured and bills them, bringing suit against 
those who fail to pay.69 All insurance plans offer the same basic basket of coverage but 
vary in terms of type of plan (standard, managed care, gatekeeping, or telemedicine) and 
level of deductibles (ranging from 300-2500 Swiss Francs).  They offer a variety of 
provider networks and yield hundreds of options.70  Insured persons pay co-insurance of 
10%, up to an annual cap of approximately $500 for adults. Eighty private health insurers 
offered coverage in 2011, and the average Swiss resident could choose among 59 
insurers.71 
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b. In Germany, insurance is provided for the majority of residents (90%) through a statutory 
health insurance scheme composed of a large number (124 in 2015) of private, non-profit 
insurers.72 The package of benefits is fixed, as are premiums, while cost sharing is capped 
at 2% of household income for adults (children are exempt from cost-sharing). Germans 
with household incomes above a certain level and, ironically, civil servants can opt for 
private insurance through a number (43) of private insurance companies, some of which 
are for-profit. 
c. Singapore requires participation in MediShield Life, the premium-funded, government- 
administered catastrophic health insurance plan, and has established significant penalties 
and recovery mechanisms for non-payment. It further mandates contributions to 
compulsory health savings accounts, called Medisave, which are used to cover routine 
health care expenses, including outpatient care.  MediShield covers hospitalization only 
in the lower-cost public hospital wards; patients wishing to receive care in more 
expensive public or private hospital wards must pay the difference out of pocket or 
purchase additional private insurance plans, available from a number of private insurers, 
to supplement MediShield’s coverage. MediShield also includes significant deductibles 
(ranging from $1,500 to $3,000) and co-insurance. There are no caps on out-of-pocket 
spending,73 but 2015 reforms significantly decreased the amount of co-insurance incurred 
by patients.74 
 
Tax Reform, Transparency, and Consumer Safeguard Laws That Can Make It Happen 
To achieve the results of our simulation, employees must have full control over the 
dollars that purchase their health insurance.  Specifically, they must freely decide how much of 
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an employer’s contribution to apply towards the tax-free purchase health insurance and how 
much to take home as taxed wages.  A tax exclusion for employees’ purchase of their own health 
insurance enables them to make wage-insurance tradeoffs that would best meet their financial 
needs. 
Current law, however, would tax any lump sum payments given to an employee, even if 
some of such payments were for buying health insurance. Although the U.S. Congress could 
rewrite the tax code to redefine the tax exemption to include certain payments made to 
employees for purchasing health insurance, federal agencies can act under existing statutory 
authority to achieve the same result. We propose three such actions that are available to the 
Internal Revenue Service under current law. Each one requires revisiting IRS Notice 2013-54, 
which offered a restrictive interpretation to the Affordable Care Act’s “annual limit restriction.” 
Prior to passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), many health insurance plans set an 
annual limit—a dollar limit on their yearly spending for an insured’s benefits—and required the 
insured to pay for the cost of all care that exceeded those limits. Congress deemed such plans to 
run counter to the primary purpose of health insurance—that is, protection against financial 
catastrophe—and included in the ACA a prohibition against annual dollar limits for any benefits 
that fall within the ACA’s “essential health benefits.”  This prohibition applies to all non-
grandfathered job-related and individual health insurance plans. 
Subsequent to the ACA’s passage, a question arose of how to apply the ACA’s 
prohibition of annual dollar limits to health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs), health flexible 
spending arrangements (FSAs), and especially, health insurance plans that fall under Revenue 
Ruling 61-146 in which an employer reimburses an employee’s substantiated premiums for non-
employer sponsored insurance.  In each of these arrangements, employers give finite payments to 
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employees that employees then use to purchase health insurance or other health services. The 
question presented to the IRS was whether these payments—precisely because they are finite—
violate the ACA’s ban on annual dollar limits. 
On September 13, 2013, the Internal Revenue Service issued Notice 2013-54 to offer 
guidance on these questions (the Department of Labor, responsible for issuing regulations under 
ERISA, issued DOL Technical Release 2013-03 the same day, which contained substantively 
identical rulings). The notice determined that each of these employer-sponsored group health 
plans, on their own, fails to satisfy the annual dollar limit prohibition. They are permissible under 
the ACA only if they are integrated with another employer-sponsored group health plan that 
satisfies the ACA. Thus, Notice 2013-54 disallows strategies employers might use to transfer tax 
exempt payments to employees for their purchase of health insurance.  
Three Alternatives to 2013-54 
Notice 2013-54, like any IRS notice, can be reversed at will by the IRS without any 
formal or informal rulemaking process. To achieve the benefits forecast from the simulation, 
three alternatives to Notice 2013-54 would bring tax parity to employer and employee purchases 
of health insurance: 
1.  The IRS could simply revise Notice 2013-54 for all payments made from employers to 
employees for the purpose of purchasing insurance. Formally, this would entail reversing 
Notice 2013-54’s determination that HRAs, FSAs, and individual reimbursements under 
Rule 61-146 are all deemed to be “group health plans” for the purpose of the ACA’s 
market reforms. From a technical standpoint, these plans resist a conventional label as 
group plans because they are tailored to individual employee decisions. From a 
substantive perspective, this revision would maintain the spirit of the ACA’s market 
	 24	
reforms if the employee uses the exempt funds to purchase an insurance plan that 
otherwise meets the ACA’s essential health benefits and other protections. 
2.  Alternatively, the IRS could more narrowly revise Notice 2013-54 to exempt Section 
105 health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs) from the ACA’s annual limit restriction. 
Although Section 105 plans have typically been considered group health plans, and thus 
technically would fall under the ACA’s market reforms, they were crafted with the intent 
of allowing employees to individualize their health expenditures, including the 
purchasing of insurance. Thus, Section 105 appears to be designed to enable employees 
to obtain insurance in the individual market while enjoying tax parity with workers who 
have group coverage. Notice 2013-54 could be revised to sustain this purpose of Section 
105 plans, perhaps provided that other ACA safeguards are met. 
One drawback to this approach, limiting the tax exclusion to Section 105 plans rather 
than broader 61-146 plans, is that health reimbursement arrangements do not fully allow 
employees to choose between tax excluded funds to purchase health insurance and taxed 
take-home income.  HRA funds are restricted to health expenses, and unused funds can 
be forfeited at termination at retirement and are often limited in annual rollover amounts. 
3.  Finally, the IRS could revise Notice 2013-54 to expand flexibility under Section 125 
Cafeteria Plan FSAs.  Because employees participating in cafeteria plans are permitted to 
choose reduced wages in exchange for the pre-tax purchase of insurance and other health 
services, Section 125 plans enable employees to make precisely the wage-insurance 
tradeoffs that are at the heart of our proposal.  Notice 2013-54 could allow Section 125 
plans to be used to purchase insurance plans that satisfy the ACA’s market reforms and 
other requirements.  One drawback of typical Section 125 plans is that employees forfeit 
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whatever contribution they fail to use within the calendar year.  However, because the 
ACA mandates the annual purchase of insurance, and thus would require employees to 
spend their FSA funds for that purpose, this limitation to Section 125 plans would not 
newly penalize employees.  In sum, federal agencies have the authority under current law 
to develop rules that would enable employees to use employer contributions to purchase 
their own plans.  To a large degree, such rules would reflect the original Congressional 
intent behind these employee benefit provisions and would more smoothly reconcile the 
ACA’s requirements with prior law. 
 Transparency Requirements  
 Placing the authority to purchase health insurance into the hands of employees requires 
more than changes to the tax exclusion. There also must be transparency to the employer’s lump 
sum payments, and accounting mechanisms must be in place to assure employees that they have 
full access to the funds their employers make available to them. 
Current law requires employers to report the cost of certain coverage under an employer-
sponsored group health plan at the conclusion of each year.  But the reporting requirement, 
disclosed in Box 12 of the employee’s W-2, is both abstruse and misleading.  Current 
requirements obligate reporting of only some types of health care coverage, with elements of 
cost reporting remaining optional.  Moreover, the disclosure amount reflects both employer and 
employee contributions, so the W-2 inadequately informs the employee of the amount available 
from employer contributions. To induce employees to take charge of their selecting and 
purchasing health insurance, communication to employees must clearly identify the funds made 
available to them and their financial alternatives. 
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Adapting either Section 105 or Section 125 plans for health insurance might resolve this 
accounting problem. For both HRAs and FSAs, employees are given discrete accounts and 
charged with clear spending alternatives. This accounting format would make employees fully 
aware of the funds made available to them for purchasing insurance. Moreover, this accounting 
method deters employers from any temptation to extract those resources from their unwitting 
employees and would remain distinct from workers’ wages.  
Were the tax exemption extended to 64-146 plans, in which employees are much less 
familiar with the funds available to them, additional mechanisms might be necessary to 
meaningfully empower employees as insurance consumers. Employer-sponsored funds for health 
insurance could be presented in accounts that mirror those used for FSAs and HRAs, thus 
communicating to employees that they have access to a finite budget and safeguarding funds 
from employer opportunism. In this manner, employees can meaningfully comprehend their 
options between purchasing insurance and increasing take-home pay. 
Default Health Insurance Options 
Employees might also require protection in the event that they either fail to purchase 
health insurance with their employer-allocated funds or fail to update their insurance plan as they 
age. Just as retirement plans offer a default lifecycle option that reflects asset allocations that 
adjust for age, insurance purchasing plans can similarly offer age-appropriate default options. 
The default plan would be more comprehensive, with lower copayments, as the employee ages, 
and employees could additionally select a lifecycle option that would automatically update their 
annual insurance selections. A similarly structured wealth-adjusted option could automatically 
update an employee’s insurance selections as she earns higher wages, with more spent on health 
insurance as the employee’s total compensation rises (both the diminishing marginal utility of 
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income and the increasing marginal tax rate would suggest such a default). Instituting these 
default options are rudimentary safeguards against consumer inertia, inattention, or confusion. 
The essential lesson is that employees can act as powerful consumers—and can trigger 
powerful market effects—if they receive adequate information to act intelligently, have access to 
meaningful options, and enjoy the basic safeguards to protect them from the most egregious 
errors. 
Conclusion 
 It is unfortunately common for well-intended tax policies to work against middle class 
workers and introduce costly economic distortions.  In the case of the health insurance tax 
exclusion, we see a perfect storm of bad policy, and to the many harms that economists have 
traced from the exclusion, we add one more:  it traps workers into health plans that are costlier 
than those they would prefer to purchase, and in turn it prevents them from adding to their take-
home pay.  Our simulation quantifies this effect, finding that if workers were given the 
opportunity to trade untaxed insurance dollars for taxed wages, they would choose to increase 
their take-home pay from $7,000-8,200.  This, in turn, causes nationwide after-tax household 
income to grow by more than $448 billion and tax revenues to increase by more than $122 
billion annually.  And it introduces much-needed price competition in health insurance, making 
the cost of insurance more affordable for all. 
 Fortunately, only a minor tweak to our tax laws would usher in these valuable results.  A 
simple administrative revision to IRS Notice 2013-54 would allow employers to give full control 
over their premium contributions to employees and generate the positive consequences predicted 
by our simulation.  The successes of the German, Swiss, and Singaporean health systems—each 
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of which allow individuals to make insurance purchases directly—offer additional evidence of 
the promise for such a reform. 
And as beneficial as these changes would be for the U.S. health insurance markets and 
national treasury, even more compelling is its direct effect on individual workers that have 
suffered from stagnant wages and growing income inequality.  This plan gives them both the 
opportunity to use their limited incomes for the purposes that suit them most and the dignity of 
making those choices for themselves.   
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Appendix 
Simulation Formula 
The income increase variable is the percent increase in household income from receiving the 
employer   contribution as income: 
%Δincome=income1−income0income0=employer   contributionincome0. 
%Δincome=income1−income0income0=employer   contributionincome0. 
 
The price increase variable is the percent increase in the price of health insurance after the 
employer subsidy is removed: 
%Δprice=price1−price0price0=employer contribution employee contribution. 
Δprice=price1−price0price0=employer contribution employee contribution. 
 
The new health insurance purchase variable is the amount of health insurance purchased once 
health insurance is no longer subsidized and salaries are increased: 
insurance1=insurance0[1+(%Δincome×%Δinsurance%Δincome) + (%Δprice×%Δ 
insurance%Δprice)]. 
insurance1=insurance0[1+(%Δincome×%Δinsurance%Δincome)+(%Δprice×%Δinsuranc 
e%Δpri  ce)]. 
 
Assuming that health insurance purchases are tax-deductible before and after the reform, the 
household's  increase in taxable income is: 
−Δinsurance = [employer contribution + employee contribution] − insurance1. 
−Δinsurance = [employer contribution + employee contribution] − insurance1. 
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To calculate the new U.S. Federal tax revenue, the simulation sums over the five income classes, 
multiplying the number of people with private health insurance times their new taxable income 
times their marginal tax rate. 
 
Caveats 
This simulation has the following caveats caused by limitations on available data: 
1. It uses the same insurance expense for all income classes. But lower-income employees 
who work in a firm primarily composed of lower–income workers receive less health insurance 
than those who   work in firms whose employees have a more diverse mix of income. The results 
thus likely overstate the tax and income benefits to lower income classes and understate these 
benefits to upper income ones. The data needed to disentangle these effects - health insurance 
expenses by income class-were not readily available. 
2. The simulation uses the mean of marginal tax rates in the cases where tax rates straddle 
its income classes. The effect of this on the results is likely small. 
3. The simulation does not address the impact on payroll taxes, but it is likely much smaller 
than the effects on Federal tax revenues and after-tax income 
4. Household responsiveness (elasticity) to income and price changes are assumed to be 
constant 1 and equal to 0.1 and -0.2, respectively, across income classes. Consequently, the 
simulation finds the counter-intuitive result that low-income households purchase more health 
insurance than high-income households. 
This model’s simplicity is its greatest strength and its greatest weakness. Simplicity is a 
strength because the assumptions (input data) are easy to understand. Simplicity is a weakness 
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because the models conclusions are subject to more caveats due to the strong simplifying 
assumptions used. After an extensive literature review, we believe the input data (simulation 
assumptions) are quite reasonable. 
We have made the simulation available online at 
https://amarder.shinyapps.io/rherzlinger/. Please edit the input data (simulation assumptions) to 
see how the simulation conclusions change in response. 
The literature gives ranges of possible values for the income and price elasticities of 
demand. We use the midpoint of those ranges as initial values to our simulation. Please vary 
these input values to see how the simulation results respond. 
 
Frequently Asked Questions 
1. The marginal tax rate is known. Why is it a variable in the simulation? 
The input data for the simulation has five income ranges. These ranges are defined in the 2014 
CPS ASEC. Because some of these ranges overlap multiple marginal tax rate ranges, it is 
difficult to know the actual marginal tax rate applied to households in those income classes. The 
simulation took the mean of the marginal tax rates if an income class straddled two tax rates. 
2. Why did you use these data? 
The data for the household income, population, and population with private insurance variables 
come from the CPS ASEC. “The CPS is a monthly U.S. household survey conducted jointly by 
the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Initiated in the 1940s in the wake of 
the Great Depression, the survey was designed to measure unemployment. A battery of labor 
force and demographic questions, known as the 'basic monthly survey,' is asked every month. 
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Over time, supplemental inquiries on special topics have been added for particular months. 
Among these supplemental surveys, the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (hereafter 
referred to as the ASEC) is the most widely used by social scientists and policymakers.” IPUMS- 
CPS FAQ 
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